cognitive control and individual differences in economic ultimatum decision-making在经济最后通牒决策认知控制和个体差异.pdf
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Cognitive Control and Individual Differences in Economic
Ultimatum Decision-Making
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Wim De Neys *, Nikolay Novitskiy , Leen Geeraerts , Jennifer Ramautar , Johan Wagemans
1 Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Toulouse, Toulouse, France, 2 Lab Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium,
3 Department of Economics and Applied Economics, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, 4 Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
Much publicity has been given to the fact that people’s economic decisions often deviate from the rational predictions of
standard economic models. In the classic ultimatum game, for example, most people turn down financial gains by rejecting
unequal monetary splits. The present study points to neglected individual differences in this debate. After participants
played the ultimatum game we tested for individual differences in cognitive control capacity of the most and least
economic responders. The key finding was that people who were higher in cognitive control, as measured by behavioral
(Go/No-Go performance) and neural (No-Go N2 amplitude) markers, did tend to behave more in line with the standard
models and showed increased acceptance of unequal splits. Hence, the cognitively highest scoring decision-makers were
more likely to maximize their monetary payoffs and adhere to the standard economic predictions. Findings question
popular claims with respect to the rejection of standard economic models and the irrationality of human economic
decision-making.
Citation: De Neys W, Novitskiy N, Geeraerts L, Ramautar J, Wagemans J (2011) Cognitive Control and Individual Differe
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