贸易信贷、担保清算和借款的约束外文翻译.doc

外文翻译 原文 Trade credit,collateral liquidation and borrowing constraints Material Source: National Centre of Competence in Research Financial Valuation and Risk Management Working Paper No.251 Author: AnnaMaria C.Menichini The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides a sketch of the related literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses the determinants of trade credit, distinguishing between liquidation and incentive motives. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 explores the effect of incorporating the specific content of the bankruptcy and commercial laws on our predictions. Section 6 concludes. 1 Related literature One of the main objectives of the literature on trade credit has been to explain why agents should want to borrow from firms rather than from financial intermediaries. The traditional explanation has been that trade credit serves a non financial role. More precisely, it allows to reduce transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), implement price discrimination across customers with different creditworthiness (Brennan et al., 1988), facilitate the establishment of long term relationships with customers (Summers and Wilson, 2002), and even provide a warranty for product quality when customers cannot observe product characteristics (Long et al., 1993). Although these non-financial theories can explain the existence of trade credit, they do not deliver any prediction on how borrowing constraints affect the demand for trade credit, since credit rationing is not explicitly modeled in any of these papers. Financial theories have attempted to fill this gap (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004, among others). In these theories the supplier has an information advantage over financial institutions in lending to the buyer. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), whose analysis is closest to ours, construct a model in which banks have an intermediation advantage, while suppliers have an information advantage whi