行政总裁股权激励和会计违规外文翻译.doc

外文翻译 Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities Material Source: School foreign nets Author: Gordon Evans This study examines the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives and accounting irregularities (i.e., restatements, Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Actions, and shareholder class action lawsuits). Although equity holdings may mitigate certain agency problems between executives and shareholders, researchers, regulators, and the business press have voiced concerns that “high-powered” equity incentives might also motivate executives to manipulate accounting information for personal gain. This view assumes that stock prices are a function of reported earnings and posits that executives manipulate accounting earnings to increase the value of their personal equity holdings. 1If this allegation is true and the economic cost of accounting manipulation is large, this idea has important implications for executive compensation contract design and corporate monitoring by both internal and external parties. Although at least ten recent studies examine the relationship between equity incentives and various types of accounting irregularities, a convergent set of results does not emerge from this literature. In particular, eight prior studies fiThis study examines the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives and accounting irregularities (i.e., restatements, Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Actions, and shareholder class action lawsuits). The wealth of most executives is highly concentrated in a portfolio of stock, restricted stock, stock options, and human capital that is directly linked to changes in shareholder value. Although equity holdings may mitigate certain agency problems in the principal-agent relationship that exists between executives and shareholders, researchers, regulators, and the busi