股权激励外文文献.doc

外文文献原文 The Diffusion of Equity Incentive Plans in Italian Listed Companies 1.INTRODUCTION Past studies have brought to light the dissimilarities in the pay packages of managers in Anglo-Saxon countries as compared with other nations (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; Chef?ns and Thomas, 2004; Zattoni, 2007). In the UK and, above all in the US, remuneration encompasses a variety of components, and short and long term variable pay carries more weight than elsewhere (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). In other countries, however, fixed wages have always been the main ingredient in top managers’ pay schemes. Over time, variable short-term pay has become more substantial and the impact of fringe benefits has gradually grown. Notwithstanding, incentives linked to reaching medium to long-term company goals have never been widely used (Towers Perrin, 2000). In recent years, however, pay packages of managers have undergone an appreciable change as variable pay has increased considerably, even outside the US and the UK. In particular, managers in most countries have experienced an increase in the variable pay related to long-term goals. Within the context of this general trend toward medium and long-term incentives, there is a pronounced tendency to adopt plans involving stocks or stock options (Towers Perrin, 2000; 2005). The drivers of the diffusion of long term incentive plans seem to be some recent changes in the institutional and market environment at the local and global levels. Particularly important triggers of the convergence toward the US pay paradigm are both market oriented drivers, such as the evolving share ownership patterns or the internationalization of the labor market, and law-oriented drivers, such as corporate or tax regulation (Chef?ns and Thomas, 2004). Driven by these changes in the institutional and market environment, we observe a global trend toward the “Americanization of international pay practices,” characterized by high incentives and very lucrativ