Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up FirmsEmpirical Evidence 风险投资与初创企业专业化：实证研究.pdf

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LVII, NO. 1 • FEB. 2002 Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence THOMAS HELLMANN and MANJU PURI* ABSTRACT This paper examines the impact venture capital can have on the development of new firms. Using a hand-collected data set on Silicon Valley start-ups, we find that venture capital is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. Venture-capital-backed companies are also more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outside CEO, both in situations that appear adversar- ial and those mutually agreed to. The evidence suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of traditional financial intermediaries. IN THIS PAPER, WE SET OUT to empirically examine whether venture capitalists play a role in the professionalization of start-up companies. We use a unique hand-collected data set of Silicon Valley start-ups that allows us to observe aspects of the internal organization of firms. We find that venture capital- ists play a role at the top of the organization, in terms of replacing the original founders with an outside CEO. Moreover they seem to influence developments further down the organization, in terms of playing a role for the introduction of stock option plans, the hiring of a VP of sales and mar- keting, and the formulation of human resource policies. Traditional financial intermediation theory tends to focus on information- based roles of financial intermediaries, dealing with the alleviation of moral hazard or adverse selection ~Diamond ~1984!, Fama ~1985!, Stiglitz ~1985!!. * Hellmann