哈伯德英文版微观经济学练习c17.doc

Microeconomics - Testbank 1 (Hubbard/OBrien) Chapter 17 The Economics of Information 1) When one party to an economic transaction has less information than the other party it is known as: A) moral hazard. B) economic irrationality. C) asymmetric information. D) adverse selection.  2) When people who buy insurance change their behavior because they are protected from loss by the insurance, the insurance market exhibits: A) moral hazard. B) adverse selection. C) asymmetric information. D) economic irrationality. 3) When an insurance company attracts buyers who know they are more likely make a claim on the policy than the insurance company knows, the insurance company is suffering: A) moral hazard. B) adverse selection. C) asymmetric information. D) economic irrationality. 4) The party with the most information about firms selling stocks and bonds is: A) stock and bond brokers who earn a living by recommending financial assets. B) the firm selling the stocks and bonds. C) a person who may buy the stocks and bonds. D) every party in the financial market has access to the same level of information. 5) Buyers and sellers have complete knowledge about the product being bought and sold in: A) the market for the right to drill for oil on government land. B) the telecommunications market. C) the market for used automobiles. D) none of the above. 6) In a used car market where half the cars are good and half are lemons, rational buyers will make bids half-way between what they would pay for a good car and a lemon car and sellers will agree to sell mostly the lemons at that price resulting due to: A) moral hazard. B) adverse selection. C) an efficient market. D) economic irrationality. 7) In a market situation with asymmetric information, the participant with the most knowledge is able to agree to a transaction that benefits them and causes the seller to not benefit due to: A)