correlates of cooperation in a one-shot high-stakes televised prisoners dilemma相关的合作只有一次的高风险的电视囚徒困境.pdf

Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners’ Dilemma Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew*, Stuart A. West Department of Zoology, The University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom Abstract Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners’ dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners’ dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when ‘‘playing’’ for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected. Citation: Burton-Chellew MN, West SA (2012) Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners’ Dilemma. PLoS ONE 7(4): e33344. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033344 Editor: Antje Engelhardt, German Primate Centre, Germany Received November 4, 2011; Accepted February 13, 2012; Published April 2, 2012 Copyright: 2012 Burton-Chellew, West. This is an open-access article distributed under t