反向购买会计制度研究中英文外文文献翻译2017.doc

本科毕业设计（论文） 中英文对照翻译 (此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!) 文献出处： Martin Davy. The Research of Reverse purchase Accounting Regimes [J]. Thomas Jefferson Law Review, 2017, 1(3):41-51. 原文 The Research of Reverse Purchase Accounting Regimes Martin Davy INTRODUCTION In 2010, federal regulators and politicians became increasingly concerned over the accounting practices of Chinese companies that trade on U.S. stock exchanges. In particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) targeted companies that went public through a process called the reverse merger. The instances of fraud became so widespread, regulators and commentators coined the term Chinese Reverse Merger (“CRM”) in order to describe a sector where investors assume the risk of accounting irregularities. Although CRMs must comply with international accounting standards, a weak rule of law in China has resulted in poor implementation and enforcement of its accounting regime. U.S. regulators are hindered in policing accountants since the auditing occurs in China, where they have no jurisdiction. This article explores two related questions: (1) the degree to which China’s weak rule of law as to its accounting regime can be explained by its political economy, and (2) whether U.S. regulatory actions and market responses might help drive change in the quality and enforcement of accounting laws in China? Part I of this Article provides an account of how Chinese companies access U.S. stock exchanges, the rise of CRMs and the emergence of the accounting scandal. In Part II, the Article discusses different theories in comparative capitalism studies to determine whether the degree to which a country has a strong rule of law is determined by its political economy. Part III contains an analysis of the societal, economic, legal, and political causes of China’s weak accounting regime. Part IV examines the degree to which the U.S. regulatory and market responses to the CRM scandal might help drive institutional change in China. R