供应链融资的供应商与制造商委托代理激励机制研究.PDF

2010 10 24 10( 130) 白少布,刘! 洪 (南京大学 商学院, 南京 210093) : , , ,, ,,, , : ;; ; : F2703! ! ! ! : A! ! ! ! : 1001- 8409( 2010) 10- 0023- 07 Principal- agent IncentiveM echanism of the Supplier andM anufacturer in Supply Chain Financing BAI Shaobu, LIU ong (School of Bus iness, N anj ing University, N anj ing 210093) Abstract: In supply chain financing, thematerials supply contract between small and medium- sized suppliers and the coremanufacturer comes down to a principal- agent incentive contract. Under symmetric information, by working out a linear incentive scheme, themanufacturerenables the suppliers to reach theParetoOptmi a,l and re alizes thebenefit- costParetoOptmi al between the principaland the agent. Under asymmetric information, by de vising a linear incentive scheme, the manufacturer, at the minmi um agency cost, makes the suppliers optmi ize their effort levels and take their share of risks, hence the expected benefit utility optmi al for both themanufacturer and the suppliers can be realized. Key words: supply chain financing; principal- agent; incentivemechanism; optmi al effort level 1! , , , , , (), , [ 1] [ 2] (