Crime and punishment in scientific research.pdf

Crime and punishment in scientific research Mathieu Bouville mathieu.bouville@ Typical arguments against scientific misconduct generally fail to support current policies on research fraud: they may not prove wrong what is usually considered research misconduct and they tend to make wrong things that are not normally seen as scientific fraud, in particular honest errors. I also point out that sanctions are not consistent with the reasons why scientific fraud is supposed to be wrong either. Moreover honestly seeking truth should not be contrived as a moral rule — it is instead a necessary condition for work to qualify as scientific. Keywords: cheating; ethics; fabrication; falsification; honesty; integrity; plagiarism; research fraud; scientific misconduct I. INTRODUCTION: FRAUD, FROM SCIENCE TO BUREAUCRACY Both philosophers (Hofmann, 2007; Kaposy, 2008; Schmaus, 1983, 1984) and sociologists (Merton, 1942; Wunderlich, 1974; Zuckerman, 1977, 1984) have asked, in their different ways, what is acceptable scientific behavior. Punishment is not their main concern (even though it may follow from other considerations). On the other hand, scientists, politicians, and lawyers have focused on sanctions for misconduct.1 There is little interaction between the two: David Guston (1999) found that the changing public policies of the past few decades corresponded to equally changing underlying conceptions of scientific norms. But policy makers did not always notice that a different policy likely means a different construal of scientific fraud; in fact certain policies may not correspond to any coherent theory at all. Policies are essentially ad hoc: inclusion or exclusion of certain deeds as scientific misconduct does not come from a careful and consistent argumentation. To James Dooley and Helen Kerch (2000), “scientific misconduct includes fabrication, falsification, and plagiari