consistent beliefs in extensive form games一致的信仰广泛形式的游戏.pdf

Games 2010, 1, 415-421; doi:10.3390/g1040415 OPEN ACCESS games ISSN 2073-4336 /journal/games Article Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games Paulo Barelli Department of Economics, University of Rochester, 214 Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 14627, USA; E-Mail: paulo.barelli@; Tel.: 1-585-275-8075; Fax: 1-585-256-2309 ´ ´ ˜ Insper Institute of Education and Research, Rua Quata, 300 - Vila Olımpia 04546-042, Sao Paulo, Brazil Received: 1 July 2010; in revised form: 26 September 2010 / Accepted: 15 October 2010 / Published: 20 October 2010 Abstract: We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions. Keywords: hierarchies of conditional beliefs; epistemic conditions; common belief; correlated subgame perfect equilibrium 1. Introduction Battigalli and Sinischalchi [ 1] constructed the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs and used it to provide epistemic foundations for solution concepts in dynamic games. We consider the question of consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs. In the space of hierarchies of beliefs, Aumann [2], Aumann and Brandenburger [3] and Barelli [4], among others, have used consistency of beliefs to provide epistemic foundations fo