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To appear in a special issue of Games and Economic Behavior, edited by Aldo Rustichini Deco.pdf

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To appear in a special issue of Games and Economic Behavior, edited by Aldo Rustichini Deconstructing the Law of Effect C. R. Gallistel* Abstract Do the consequences of past behavior alter future policy, as the law of effect assumes? Or, are behavioral policies based on behaviorally produced information about the state of the world, but not themselves subject to change? In the first case, stable policies are equilibria discovered by trial and error, so adjustments to abrupt changes in the environment must proceed slowly. In the second, adjustments can be as abrupt as the environmental changes. Matching behavior is the robust tendency of subjects to match the relative time and effort they invest in different foraging options to the relative incomes derived from them. Measurement of the time course of adjustments to step changes in the reward-scheduling environment show that adjustments can be as abrupt as the changes that drives them, and can occur with the minimum possible latency. Broader implications for theories about the role of experience in behavior are discussed. Economists and psychologists commonly assume that behavior is shaped by its consequences. Psychologists call this the law of effect, by which they understand that we and other animals try different behaviors, assess their effects, and do more of those with better effects and less with those with worse. On this view, the behaviorally important consequence of a behavior is the information it provides about behavioral outcomes. The effect of the information is to alter policy. There is, however, a different way in which the consequences of behavior may shape future behavior. Some policies depend for their execution on information about the state of the world. Changing the inf
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