非独立董事在英国中小型企业和未上市证券市场的薪酬分析外文翻译.doc

外文翻译 原文 The remuneration of non-owner managers in UK unquoted and Unlisted Securities Market enterprises: An empirical analysis of firm specific, human capital and job history influences Material Source: small business economics Author: David Storey Robert Watson Pooran Wynarczyk This paper empirically examines the remuneration of non-owner managers employed by small and medium sized UK enterprises (SMEs). The empirical analysis focuses upon the relative explanato power of a number of labour market, firm specific and human capital variables with respect to managerial remuneration levels. Non-owning managerial employees have been largety ignored by small firm researchers who, following Botton(1971), have generally assumed that the ownermanager(s) are the sole managerial resource of the business. Even the large firm literature has tended to neglect middle managers and has concentrated instead on the remuneration of chief executive officers (CEOs). The agency costs associated with the separation of ownership from control characteristic of large firms has focused this research even more narrowly upon the relative incentive compatibility of various contractual arrangements for aligning CEO remuneration with firm performance measures (Main, 1991). As the CEO and the other board members are normally also the major (or even sole) share-holders, much of this large firm research is of limited relevance of SMEs. This close involvement of the owner-manager(s) in the day-to-day operations of the business has, however, important labour relations implications, particularly with respect to relations with managerial employees. SMEs are much less likely than large firms to operate any sort of formal Internal Labour Market(ILM) and employees at all levels are much less likely to be unionised than their large firm counterparts(Brown, Hamilton and Medoff, 1990). Consequently, individual conditions of employment and pay levels are often determined by direct i