财务报告及补充自愿性信息披露【外文翻译】.doc

外文翻译 原文： Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager’s private information is a signal correlated with the ?rm’s liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager’s private information complements the mandatory disclosure and show that the content and likelihood of a voluntary disclosure depend on whether the mandatory reports contain good or bad news. This different information asymmetry produces new, testable implications regarding the probability of and market reaction to voluntary disclosures. We also show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can have unintended consequences due to their effects on the manager’s willingness to voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures. 1. Introduction Standard voluntary disclosure models capture the effect of changes in mandatory disclosure on the voluntary disclosure of a private signal (correlated with ?rm value) as changes in the ?rm’s information environment. That is, an increase in mandatory disclosure is generally interpreted as either a decrease in the market’s prior variance of the ?rm’s liquidation value or, more recently, as the release of an additional signal correlated with the ?rm’s liquidation value. In either case, the ?rst main result in this literature is that an increase in mandatory disclosure leads to a decrease in the probability of voluntary disclosure (i.e., mandatory and voluntary disclosures are substitutes). The second main result is that the manager’s voluntary disclosure decision does not depend on the information in the mandatory disclosure (i.e., whether it contains good or bad news). The objective of this paper is to extend the voluntary disclosure literature by examining an alternative source of information asymmetry. Rather than assuming the manager knows a signal correlated with ?rm value, we assume that she has pr