上市公司股权结构与公司业绩研究中英文外文文献翻译2017.doc

本科毕业设计（论文） 中英文对照翻译 (此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!) 文献出处： Hudaib M. The research of ownership structure and company performance of the listed company[J]. Journal of Business Finance Accounting, 2017, 1: 103-114. 原文 The research of ownership structure and company performance of the listed company Hudaib M Abstract High dispersion equity has been regarded as the fundamental starting point of the corporate governance research, but in recent years, in addition to a few countries such as America, Britain, Canada, most of the countries listed companies there are family, Banks or the state, such as controlling shareholders, in the presence of controlling shareholders, shareholding structure of corporate governance and performance will produce two contrary effects, namely interests encroach on convergence effect and effect. In addition, the big shareholders and in some cases directly involved in the operation and management, solves between outside shareholders and internal management in investment opportunities, the problem of asymmetric information on the performance. Visible, controlling shareholders have incentive to seek to maximize the value of the company, and have the ability to impose enough control on corporate management to realize its own interests, so as to better solve the traditional agency problem, therefore equity concentration relative to equity dispersible company to have high profitability and market performance. Keywords: equity structure; capital structure; company performance 1 Introduction Demme seitz and laporte believes that the interests of controlling shareholders and small outside shareholders interests are often inconsistent, there are serious conflicts between the two. In the absence of external control threat, or outside shareholders type under the condition of more diversified, controlling shareholders may be at the expense of the interests of other shareholders to pursue its own interests, through the pursuit of self-interest goal rather than